In my previous post I did a short review of the book The Making of Modern Afghanistan, which looks at the politics and economy of Afghanistan through roughly 1800 - 1850, with a focus on the effects of the policies and actions of the British East India Company (EIC).
As far as the EIC goes, it is important to understand that such companies did not concern themselves only with trade - well maybe they did - but politics and warfare were very much part of the activities of such a trading company. They were often responsible for the collection of intelligence, the forming of policy, the conduct of negotiations and the commissioning of soldiers and officers.
Whilst not the main subject of the book, it does go into some difficulties of intelligence operations performed by the company, which filter into three main categories:
- The collection of intelligence.
- The analysis of intelligence and the process of turning information into 'knowledge'.
- The policies formed and the action taken on the basis of 'knowledge'.
My interest is mainly in the first two of these points.
The first problem with the intelligence gathering process initiated by the company was a result of Elphinstone's early but major work - a large body of work it laid a framework that slightly misread the political landscape at the time by equating the Afghan tribes to Scottish Highland clans.
This early work was basically built into the framework of gathering, analysis and policy for the next fifty years, however it didn't match up with the political situation on the ground - subsequent policy decisions simply didn't quite deal with the reality.
The next problem, compounding the first, was the company's decision to only employ a very limited number of gatherers, often journalists, in subsequent efforts. This meant that it was obvious to locals who these information sources were and that it was difficult to support or dispute one piece of information with other sources.
When company officers were commissioned to undertake delegations, these officers had a vested interest in terms of their careers in supporting various company factions of thought and their reports and actions were impacted by their career concerns.
It is interesting that one of the most difficult problems to overcome is too rigid a framework into which information has to be fit. It is difficult to design a model without some framework, however if this framework isn't at all flexible the pieces will always fit the model, rather than the model fitting the pieces.
Another problem the EIC created for themselves was one of disinterest. Elphonstone left in place a usable network however the EIC did not facilitate the network out of a shortsighted lack of interest - when the region came back to the fore nearly twenty years later it found it difficult to re-establish a good network - it was much easier to establish a network before the political landscape changed to the point it was deemed vital. They found it then difficult to integrate themselves into any local sources of information.
As I said in the book review - for anyone with an interest in intelligence gathering in the 19th and 20th centuries the book is not really recommended as its focus is elsewhere, however there are still some interesting tidbits of information.
We could for instance draw out of these mistakes some indications of how successful gathering networks may have been established:
- The network should be established as early as possible, prior to the need for information becoming imperative.
- The network should contain a number of sources of information and should integrate into local information sources without being too obvious.
- Important agents should not be too heavily invested in the knowledge and policies that may be a result of their information.
- The analysis of information should not be shoehorned to fit too rigid a framework of knowledge.