Intelligence Gathering & Jujutsu - Part 1 - Stated Japanese Intentions Towards the Dutch East Indies, 1940

In this series I am going to draw a few dots together in a round-a-bout fashion, eventually arriving at a point that is in my opinion fundamental to understanding Japanese martial arts in the 20th Century.  To start with here is a note of the meeting between the US Consul General & the Japanese Consul General in Batavia in February 1940 - such things are always interesting in hindsight.  The East Indies was one of Japan's primary targets because the colony possessed an abundance of rubber plantations and oil fields.  The Japanese only took three months to dominate the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), it was all over by the start of March 1942.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1940, THE FAR EAST, VOLUME IV

756D.94/38

Memorandum by the Consul General at Batavia (Dickover) of a Conversation With the Japanese Consul General (Saito)

Batavia, February 2, 1940.

Mr. Saito remarked that the Dutch in the Netherlands Indies were unduly suspicious of the Japanese; there was no need to be so suspicious, as the Japanese had no territorial designs on the Netherlands Indies.

I pointed out that the rapid expansion of the Japanese Empire in recent years, coupled with the “southward advance” policy advocated by the Japanese Navy, quite naturally caused a certain amount of nervousness in countries in this part of the world.

Mr. Saito said that he had been informed that the Emperor himself had told General Koiso, the Minister of Overseas Affairs in the last two Cabinets, that he would not permit any aggression by the Japanese in the Netherlands Indies. Consequently Mr. Ishii, the Japanese Minister at The Hague has informed the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs (1) that he believes that the Japanese Government is prepared to give “any assurances” desired in regard to the security of the Netherlands Indies.

Mr. Saito said that the proposal had not been made as coming from the Japanese Government (although Ishii had been instructed to make it) but as being an idea of Mr. Ishii’s, who, as an old friend of and coworker with Mr. Arita, (2) could probably influence the latter to give any assurances
which might be desired. Mr. Saito said that the same factors apply to the Philippine Islands—the Japanese Government has absolutely no territorial ambitions there and is prepared to give “any assurances” which we might desire.

I asked Mr. Saito what the Japanese expected in return for such assurances.

Mr. Saito said “Nothing but cooperation.”

I referred to the speech of Mr. Arita, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, before the House of Peers on February 1, 1940, in which he stated (as reported by Domei): “With regard to the South Seas regions the Japanese Government are desirous of maintaining with them relationships of co- existence and co-prosperity through economic cooperation and collaboration in the development of natural resources.” I said that this desire of the Japanese for “economic cooperation” and for “collaboration in the development of natural resources” also tended to cause some misgiving among the peoples of the Indies and the Philippines, as they feared that such cooperation and collaboration might draw them entirely within the Japanese economic orbit and cause them to become the “economic slaves” of Japan.

Mr. Saito said that Japan did not want to make slaves of any people. It only wanted “free access to raw materials”, in order to be in a position to feed its growing industries and to assure itself of essential raw materials in time of war. For example, said Mr. Saito, if the United States imposed an embargo on the exportation of war materials, including petroleum, to Japan, that country would be confronted with the necessity of obtaining its petroleum supplies from the Netherlands Indies. But in the Indies the oil is controlled by the Standard Oil and Shell interests. The local officials are not authorized to make decisions—they must refer all important questions to New York and London, and it is unlikely that the officials there would permit the sale of Netherlands Indian oil to Japan while cutting off supplies from other sources. Consequently the Japanese want their own oil concession in the Netherlands Indies, so that they can control their own supplies of crude petroleum, but every time they ask the Dutch for a 5–A lease, the answer is “No”. The Dutch should be more friendly. Japan has never gone back on a friend. But the Dutch are not friendly to us, said Mr. Saito, and an American embargo on the exportation of war materials to Japan is very apt to cause some reaction down here.

Mr. Saito proceeded to expound the theory that nations such as Japan are justified in expanding, because this is a dynamic, not a static world, and it is therefore impossible long to maintain the status quo, as the “have” nations wish to do. “When the small boy grows up, he cannot wear the same clothes. He has to have larger ones.”

I pointed out that there were other ways than the use of armed force to increase a country’s territory and to obtain economic opportunities. For example, I said, most of the American expansion in the past has been by purchase, not by armed force, and this process is still going on, as witness the purchase of the Virgin Islands. (3)

Mr. Saito said that he too was an advocate of expansion by peaceful means—in fact, before the Japanese invasion of Manchuria he was in the Foreign Office in Tokyo and had then urged the purchase by Japan of South Manchuria from the corrupt Manchurian war-lords. The Army would have none of the proposal, however. If Japan had purchased South Manchuria legally, it would have cost much less than the subjugation by force and the matter would have been settled for all time; which it is not under the present system. Japan can expect more trouble in Manchuria in the future.

However, said Mr. Saito, the Japanese Army is losing much of its influence in Japan. For one thing, the people are getting tired of the Army’s unprofitable adventures on the Asiatic continent. For another, the Army is now more under the control of the Emperor than it formerly was. General Hata, the War Minister, was for some time aide-de-camp to the Emperor and is very close to him. Through General Hata the Emperor can exercise greater control over the Army.

E[rle] R. D[ickover]

Copy transmitted to the Department by the Consul General in his despatch No. 474,
February 7; received March 20.

(1) E. N. van Kleffens.
(2) Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.
(3) For convention between the United States and Denmark for the cession of the

Danish West Indies (the Virgin Islands), signed August 4, 1916, see Foreign Relations, 1917, p. 694.